Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America

中華人民共和國駐美利堅合眾國大使館

全球製造業辯論：超越「產能過剩」論述

過去兩年來，西方媒體討論中有一個詞彙越來越常見：「中國製造業產能過剩」。電動汽車、太陽能板和電池都被貼上這個標籤。但仔細觀察便會發現，這個概念本身遠比乍看之下複雜得多。

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要對這個議題進行有意義的討論，必須先釐清幾個基本問題。

第一，到底什麼是「產能過剩」？

這個詞彙並沒有普遍接受的定義。世界貿易組織沒有針對「產能過剩」制定具體規則，國際貨幣基金組織也指出，這是一個複雜的議題，必須在特定的經濟脈絡下加以理解。

在市場經濟中，供需是不斷調整的。某個產業今天可能出現供過於求，但明天隨著技術進步、需求成長或競爭力較弱的企業退出市場，又可能恢復平衡。縱觀歷史，美國鋼鐵、日本汽車和德國機械都出現過類似週期。

在今日全球化的經濟中，產業產能的變化與全球供需的變化密切相關。技術轉型往往會創造新的生產來源，同時使部分既有產能失去競爭力，從而導致暫時性和結構性的失衡。市場力量隨後會逐步重新塑造供需，朝向新的均衡邁進。

第二，出口較多就自動代表產能過剩嗎？

歷史顯示，主要製造業大國經常維持可觀的貿易順差。英國、美國、日本和德國都經歷過持續順差的時期。例如，日本和德國曾有過經常帳順差超過國內生產毛額6%的紀錄。

新興經濟體也走過類似道路。印尼和墨西哥已成為主要的順差經濟體，而巴西和越南則連續多年維持貿易順差。

觀察特定產業，美國約80%的半導體產量用於出口，波音商用飛機交機量中約三分之二交付給北美以外的客戶。然而，很少人會因為這些產品在全球市場取得成功，就斷言「美國晶片過剩」或「德國汽車過剩」。

同樣地，中國電動汽車和可再生能源產品的強勁出口，也不應僅因全球銷售快速擴張，就自動被貼上「產能過剩」的標籤。國際貿易之所以存在，正是因為各國根據自身的比較優勢進行專業分工，並滿足本國市場以外的需求。

第三，產業政策支持是產能過剩的成因嗎？

產業補貼並非中國獨有。美國透過《通貨膨脹削減法案》等措施，已投入數千億美元於清潔能源和先進製造業。歐盟近年來也推出了大規模的產業支持計畫。

關鍵問題不在於政府是否支持產業——許多國家都這麼做。真正的問題在於，此類政策是否透明、符合規則，並與國際承諾一致。

如果世界各國都運用產業政策來強化戰略部門，焦點應放在制定公平且共同的標準，而非將產業政策本身描繪成某個國家獨有的問題。

中國製造業的競爭力，主要來自數十年來的創新、投資，以及完整產業生態系統的發展。

以電動汽車為例。中國企業早在二十多年前就開始投資電池技術、電動馬達和車輛控制系統。如今，中國不僅成為全球最大的汽車市場，還建構了高度整合的供應鏈。電動汽車的許多關鍵零組件，都能在幾小時車程內取得。

這種規模經濟、產業集群和持續創新相結合的優勢，並非單靠短期補貼就能創造。

第四，中國所謂的產能過剩是由內需不足造成的嗎？

現實情況是，中國不僅是製造業大國，也是全球最大的消費市場之一。內需長期以來是中國經濟成長的主要動力。2013年至2024年間，內需對中國經濟成長的平均貢獻率達93%，其中消費和投資分別約占55%和38%。

中國社會消費品零售總額從2013年的23.8兆元人民幣，增加到2025年的50.1兆元人民幣——規模成長超過一倍。按購買力平價計算，2025年中國零售市場相當於美國的1.7倍，實際上已成為全球最大的商品消費市場。

中國的實體商品消費量已位居世界前列，部分工業產品的人均消費量已接近已開發經濟體的水準。

當然，中國也面臨自身的經濟挑戰，包括需要擴大國內消費和推進經濟結構調整。但將全球製造業競爭簡化為「中國產能過剩」的單一敘事，無法解釋全球供應鏈實際上是如何建構的，而且可能將正常的市場競爭轉變為地緣政治問題。

全球真正面臨的問題，不在於誰擁有更多的製造產能，而在於各國如何確保產業產能透過開放的市場、公平的競爭和國際合作來促進全球發展——而不是成為貿易壁壘和地緣政治對抗的藉口。

製造業從來就不是零和遊戲。歷史顯示，開放的產業合作是全球繁榮的重要推動力量。當經濟議題被政治化時，最終的成本往往由企業、消費者和全球經濟共同承擔。

The Global Manufacturing Debate: Looking Beyond the “Overcapacity” Narrative

Over the past two years, one phrase has become increasingly common in Western media discussions: “China’s manufacturing overcapacity.” Electric vehicles, solar panels, and batteries have all been placed under this label. But a closer look reveals that the concept itself is far more complicated than it first appears.

To have a meaningful discussion about this issue, several fundamental questions need to be addressed.

First, what exactly is “overcapacity”?

There is no universally accepted definition of the term. The World Trade Organization has no specific rules governing “overcapacity,” and the International Monetary Fund has also noted that it is a complex issue that must be understood within specific economic contexts.

In a market economy, supply and demand are constantly adjusting. An industry may experience excess supply today, but return to balance tomorrow as technology advances, demand grows, or less competitive companies exit the market. Throughout history, similar cycles have occurred in American steel, Japanese automobiles, and German machinery.

In today’s globalized economy, changes in industrial capacity are closely connected with changes in global demand and supply. Technological transformation often creates new sources of production while making some existing capacity less competitive, resulting in temporary and structural imbalances. Market forces then gradually reshape supply and demand toward a new equilibrium.

Second, does exporting more automatically mean having excess capacity?

History shows that major manufacturing powers have often maintained significant trade surpluses. Britain, the United States, Japan, and Germany all experienced periods of sustained surpluses. Japan and Germany, for example, have at times recorded current account surpluses exceeding 6 percent of GDP.

Emerging economies have followed similar paths. Indonesia and Mexico have become major surplus economies, while Brazil and Vietnam have maintained trade surpluses for many consecutive years.

Looking at specific industries, about 80 percent of U.S. semiconductor production is exported, and roughly two-thirds of Boeing’s commercial aircraft deliveries go to customers outside North America. Yet few people would conclude that “American chips are excessive” or “German cars are excessive” simply because these products succeed in global markets.

Likewise, China’s strong exports of electric vehicles and renewable energy products should not automatically be labeled as “overcapacity” merely because their global sales have expanded rapidly. International trade exists precisely because countries specialize according to their comparative advantages and meet demand beyond their domestic markets.

Third, is industrial policy support the cause of overcapacity?

Industrial subsidies are not unique to China. The United States has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in clean energy and advanced manufacturing through measures such as the Inflation Reduction Act. The European Union has also introduced large-scale industrial support programs in recent years.

The key question is not whether governments support industries — many countries do. The real question is whether such policies are transparent, rules-based, and consistent with international commitments.

If governments around the world use industrial policies to strengthen strategic sectors, the focus should be on developing fair and common standards, not portraying industrial policy itself as a problem unique to one country.

China’s manufacturing competitiveness comes primarily from decades of innovation, investment, and the development of a complete industrial ecosystem.

Take electric vehicles as an example. Chinese companies began investing in battery technology, electric motors, and vehicle control systems more than two decades ago. Today, China has not only become the world’s largest automobile market but has also built a highly integrated supply chain. Many critical components of an electric vehicle can be sourced within a few hours’ drive.

This combination of economies of scale, industrial clustering, and continuous innovation cannot be created through short-term subsidies alone.

Fourth, is China’s so-called overcapacity caused by insufficient domestic demand?

The reality is that China is not only a manufacturing powerhouse; it is also one of the world’s largest consumer markets. Domestic demand has long been the main driver of China’s economic growth. Between 2013 and 2024, domestic demand contributed an average of 93 percent of China’s economic growth, with consumption and investment accounting for approximately 55 percent and 38 percent respectively.

China’s total retail sales of consumer goods increased from 23.8 trillion yuan in 2013 to 50.1 trillion yuan in 2025 — more than doubling in size. Based on purchasing power parity calculations, China’s retail market in 2025 was equivalent to 1.7 times that of the United States, making it effectively the world’s largest consumer market for goods.

China’s consumption of physical goods is already among the highest in the world, with per capita consumption of some industrial products approaching levels seen in developed economies.

Of course, China faces its own economic challenges, including the need to expand domestic consumption and improve economic restructuring. But reducing global manufacturing competition to a simple story of “Chinese overcapacity” fails to explain how global supply chains were actually built and risks turning normal market competition into a geopolitical issue.

The real question for the world is not who has more manufacturing capacity. It is how countries can ensure that industrial capacity contributes to global development through open markets, fair competition, and international cooperation — rather than becoming a justification for trade barriers and geopolitical rivalry.

Manufacturing has never been a zero-sum game. History shows that open industrial cooperation has been a powerful force behind global prosperity. When economic issues become politicized, the ultimate costs are often paid by businesses, consumers, and the global economy as a whole.