In numbers: China’s contributions to UN multilateralism and global peace and devt in past half century by Global Times Oct 25 2021
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the People’s Republic of China’s lawful seat in the United Nations. In the past half century, China has always been a staunch supporter of UN-centered international order and a major contributor to UN missions. China has mobilized the largest number of standby UN peacekeeping troops, provided great material support to the global COVID-19 fight, contributed the largest part in eradicating world extreme poverty, and in spite of Western smears on China’s human rights, China has actively participated in the work of the UN’s human rights bodies. Check the statistical facts about China’s vigorous promotion of the spirit of multilateralism and its contributions to global development and justice.
After failed regime change attempts in HK in 2019 and the passing of homeland security laws in 2020, Amnesty International has decided to leave HK. 在 2019 年香港政權更迭嘗試失敗以及 2020 年通過國土安全法之後，國際特赦組織決定離開香港.
English Tsai, called herself President of Taiwan on Double 10, Taiwan military pledge allegiance to ROC and not Taiwan President. If PLA invade Taiwan, Taiwan military will surrender even faster than those in Afghanistan. 蔡英文在雙10稱自己為台灣總統，台灣軍方宣誓效忠中華民國而不是台灣總統。 如果解放軍入侵台灣，台灣軍隊的投降速度會比阿富汗軍隊還要快.
California Superior Court Judge Julie Tang: In Feb 1972 I went to work for a man called Lingchi wang Professor of UC Berkeley). I knew nothing about him except he was a volunteer at an agency he started called chinese for affirmative action. When I saw him I instantly knew this man is a superior being. He was working for free in a little office on Columbus Ave (SF). He had raised enough money to hire an office and employ a secretary. But nothing more. Everything was donated including Lingchi.
I was the only paid Secretary.
I went to work quite diligently because I agreed 100% with what he was doing – starting an organization that would fight for the civil rights of Chinese Americans along with all other minorities.
I did dictation and typed all his letters. I took minutes of meetings and also prepared a monthly newsletter to members. His goal – to get 3000 members each paying $10 yearly membership dues. I even started to contact local organization to have meetings with them about their affirmative action policy.
I left after 8 months to start graduate school. But Lingchi stayed on as a volunteer collecting no salary. He brought in a lot of donated funds and set up more staffing. He also started a Chinese Media committee that tried to hold Hollywood accountable for the chinese stereotypes on screen. I typed up a lot of letters to Hollywood including some Asian movie stars.
I developed so much respect for Lingchi and his work after that job. He changed my life forever. I would probably never have done the kind of civil rights works that I did had I not learned from Lingchi what that all meant.
And yes I later learned there was a bounty on his head issued by the chinese six company in San Francisco. It was too late for me to divest myself from his affiliation. Glad I’m still alive.
Professor Ling-chi Wang of UC Berkeley: the Chinese American community was indeed euphoric about China’s accession to the UN in 1971! 加州大學伯克利分校王教授: 1971年中國加入聯合國，美國華人社區確實欣喜若狂！Posted on Oct 25, 2021
Since the U.S. government and the KMT fasist regime in Taiwan, and their henchmen in the Chinese Six Companies in Chinatown San Francisco (CCBA) were steadfast in their opposition to restoring China’s seat to the legitimate government in Taipei, I had to personally witness how the KMT and CCBA dealt with the historic UN vote to admit China. (Before 1971, the KMT and CCBA placed each tear during the UN Fall session full-page advertisements in major U.S. newspapers, such as, the NY Times, Washington Post, etc. and organized demonstration at the UN Plaza in NY, to express Chinese American opposition to the UN resolution favoring China’s admission into the UN introduced by Third World countries. The 1971 UN session was particularly important because Nixon’s historic trip to Beijing in February, sent an unmistakable signal across the world that the U.S. would no long cast its annual veto of the resolution, replacing the KMT regime in Taiwan with the PRC government in Beijing at the UN Security Council.
CCBA, which claimed to represent ALL Chinese in the U.S., and KMT leaders, led by Doon Yen Wong (黄仁俊), the “Presidential Advisor” of Chiang Kai-shek and the unrivaled leader of KMT-USA, CCBA, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Ning Yeong District Association, the Wong Family Association, and the Bing Kong Tong, convened an international press conference in its headquarters in Chinatown on the day of the UN vote to denounce the UN decision on behalf of all Chinese in the U.S.
The assembly hall of CCBA, heavily decorated with late Qing Dynasty furniture and lanterns, was packed with Chinatown leaders and the press. When Doon Yen Wong entered the hall and saw me, he visibly upset and immediately ordered his followers to eject me. I knew his order would be carry out without hesitation. As I started walking through the crowded room, several men quickly reached me and started forcefully push me through the crowd to expel me. As they did so, he shouted out loud and stern in Cantonese 打死他! 打死他! ,”Kill him! Kill him!” The unexpected convulsion immediately attracted the attention of reporters in the room even though they did not know nor understand what was going. As soon as I got out of the hall, a German television crew caught up with me at the front door and asked me what was going on. I had an impromptu press conference at tbe steps of CCBA front door, telling the German TV what had just happened. When I returned home, I wrote a personal account of what happened at the CCBA headquarters and submitted my account to the East-West Chinese American Weekly which promptly published my account on the front-page of its next edition.
It was an experience I never forget to this day. To this day, after 50 years, I could still see Wong’s angry face and hear his loud voice asking for my blood.
That was not the first threat I encountered. Ealier, I occurred the first threat in mid-August of 1968, during the height of tourist season in Chinatown, when we, a group of young professional and college students, led by Gordon J. Lau, a young Chinese American attorney, organized a historic, loud public protest march on Grant Avenue in late Saturday afternoon and early evening. It was an unprecedented high-profile protest march. The march denounced the exploitation in Chinese immigrant workers in sewing factories, restaurants, and grocery stores in Chinatown owned and run by Chinese owners and systemic racial discrimination against Chinese in employment, housing, politics, and education outside of Chinatown. That demonstration was viewed by the CCBA as an embarrassment if not a humiliation. The Chinese Six Companies promptly issued a “Manifesto of the Chinese Six Companies” to label us as “outside agitators” and “undesirable immigrants” and threatened to ask the U.S. Congress to restore unspecified new restrictions against new immigrants. (The U.S. Congress had finally repealed the last vestiges of Chinese exclusion law, the racially based quotas, against Chinese immigrants in 1965), It was immediately after the protest that I received my first serious death threat similar to the one you mentioned in an earlier email against the leaders, including your father, who organized the first Oct. 1 celebration of the founding of the PRC in the CACA auditorium in 1949 from the Chinatown establishment.
The last two persons to be killed following threats were Prof. Chen Wen-chen (陈文成) of Carnegie-Mellon University of Pittsburgh in July 6, 1981 and Chinese American journalist, Henry Liu (江南) in Daly City, CA on Oct 15, 1984. Both were critical of the KMT regime in Taiwan. Did the U.S. care about such assassinations and rights of Chinese Americans? Not at all! The truths behind these and other cases in the U.S. and Taiwan remain shrouded in mystery and speculation. Is the U.S. government doing anything to protect Chinese Americans constantly under the threat of random violence across the U.S? Hardly. In fact, the U.S. government has been aiding and abetting such violence, declaring Chinese American open season! In this sense, the accomplice is our own government! We are expendable, as we have been since the Gold Rush when Chinese immigrants first arrived. We are useful and indispensable, but expendable.
This was why I called the period of Chinese American history between 1949 and 1989 to be a period of intense political repression when the entire Chinese American community in the U.S. came under the reign of terror when the U.S. allowed the KMT regime in Taiwan to extend its repressive long arm into the Chinese American community without restrain.
China’s admission into the UN in 1971 was an important beginning of a long process that led to Chinese American assertion of our rights as citizens of the U.S. and the gradual liberation of Chinese Americans from Taiwan’s extraterritorial rule of Chinatown, USA and the internal political repression in the name of fabricated internal national security.
California Superior Court Judge Julie Tang: In Feb 1972 I went to work for a man called Lingchi wang. I knew nothing about him except he was a volunteer at an agency he started called chinese for affirmative action. When I saw him I instantly knew this man is a superior being. He was working for free in a little office on Columbus Ave (SF). He had raised enough money to hire an office and employ a secretary. But nothing more. Everything was donated including Lingchi.
I was the only paid Secretary.
I went to work quite diligently because I agreed 100% with what he was doing – starting an organization that would fight for the civil rights of Chinese Americans along with all other minorities.
I did dictation and typed all his letters. I took minutes of meetings and also prepared a monthly newsletter to members. His goal – to get 3000 members each paying $10 yearly membership dues. I even started to contact local organization to have meetings with them about their affirmative action policy.
I left after 8 months to start graduate school. But Lingchi stayed on as a volunteer collecting no salary. He brought in a lot of donated funds and set up more staffing. He also started a Chinese Media committee that tried to hold Hollywood accountable for the chinese stereotypes on screen. I typed up a lot of letters to Hollywood including some Asian movie stars.
I developed so much respect for Lingchi and his work after that job. He changed my life forever. I would probably never have done the kind of civil rights works that I did had I not learned from Lingchi what that all meant.
And yes I later learned there was a bounty on his head issued by the chinese six company in San Francisco. It was too late for me to divest myself from his affiliation. Glad I’m still alive.
Judge Julie Tang: “This was why I called the period of Chinese American history between 1949 and 1989 to be a period of intense political repression when the entire Chinese American community in the U.S. came under the reign of terror when the U.S. allowed the KMT regime in Taiwan to extend its repressive long arm into the Chinese American community without restrain. “
Professor Ling-chi Wang of UC Berkeley: I prefer 1989 rather than 1979 because the reigns of terror by the KMT agents in the U.S. and the FBI/CIA remained vigilant and powerful. The U.S. being the last stronghold of the KMT, Taiwan had to intensify its cooperation with our internal security agencies to make sure that the pro-PRC forces in Chinatowns remained suppressed. That is why an incident like the assassinations of Henry Liu in October 1984 occurred and a newspaper like the World Journal was not allowed to report news about the investigation.
The Cold War officially ended in 1989, if you use the fall of the Berlin Wall, or 1990-91, the dismantling of the USSR. That, as you know, signaled the rise of China , the first fruit of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up policy. William Overhold published his book, entitled The Rise of China, in 1994. At that time, no one in the West paid much attention to its rise although some economists began to notice the volume of overseas investment in China in the 1990s. The West was still consumed by its Cold War triumphalism and the so-called Tiananmen Massacre. The 1997-98 global monetary crisis recovered quickly because China helped accelerate the recovery. (Just ask Hank Paulson and Charles Sumner about China’s role). But, China’s rise did not really register in the consciousness of the U.S. and the West until 2008, the global financial crisis, a crisis of Wall Street capitalism. That was a rude awakening during the first year of the Obama administration. That was the year that Obama began floating the Pivot to Asia policy and initiatives, otherwise known as the New Cold War or the containment of China by economic, political, and military means. Trump picked up and vastly expanded the Obama/Clinton policy. It turned ugly and aggressive. Biden had a chance to reverse or modified the policy. Instead, he has been making it worse.
Video: Why China proposed property tax? 時事觀察 國凱 ：中國為什麼要開始徵收房地產稅
Hello, friends of the Chinese radio station on Sing Tao. I’m Guokai. Welcome everyone to listen to the current affairs observation. On October 23, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China decided to authorize the State Council to carry out pilot reforms of real estate tax in some areas. This new development means a breakthrough in the promotion of real estate tax in China. In this episode of current affairs observation, I hope to share with you (1) why China levies real estate tax, (2) real estate tax has not been implemented after many years of discussion, and the difficulties behind it, and (3) what method the Chinese government is adopting now Break through the difficulties and advance the formulation of real estate tax. 美國星島中文電臺的聽眾朋友，大家好，我是國凱，歡迎大家收聽時事觀察。10月23日，中國全國人大常委會決定授權國務院在部分地區開展房地產稅的改革試點工作，這個新的發展意味著中國房地產稅的推進有了突破。這一集時事觀察，希望跟大家分享（1）中國為什麼要徵收房地產稅，（2）房地產稅討論了很多年也未能推行，背後的難處，以及（3）中國政府現在又採用什麼方式來突破困難，從而推進房地產稅的制定工作。
First, let’s take a look at the background of real estate tax collection. To truly understand the behavior of a government, it is necessary to understand public finances. The reason is simple: it costs money to do things, and if you don’t have money, it’s hard to put it in a good way. To grasp the true intentions and trends of the government, one cannot just read the documents, but also depends on the flow and amount of government funds. 首先，我們來看看征收房地產稅的背景。要真正理解一個政府的行為，就必須要了解公共財政。道理很簡單：辦事要花錢，如果沒錢，話說得再好聽也難以落實。要想把握政府的真實意圖和動向，不能光讀文件，還要看政府資金的流向和數量。
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, China’s central government finances fell into a serious crisis. It was this fiscal crisis that led to the tax-sharing reform in 1994. Before the tax-sharing reform, China’s central government finances were very weak. Take 1992 as an example, the national fiscal revenue was 350 billion yuan, of which the central government revenue was only 100 billion yuan, the local government revenue was 250 billion yuan, the central fiscal expenditure was 200 billion yuan, and the deficit was 100 billion yuan. At that time, China implemented a tax contract system, and local governments generally only need to hand in a pre-agreed amount of the state between the two parties. If the tax exceeds this amount, the local government retains its own control and use. 上個世紀80年代末90年代初，中國的中央政府財政陷入了嚴重危機。正是這場財政危機，導致了1994年的分稅制改革。分稅制改革之前，中國的中央政府財政非常薄弱。以1992年為例，全國財政收入3500億人民幣，其中，中央政府收入只是有1000億元，地方政府收入反而有2500億元，中央財政支出2000億元，赤字1000億元。當時，中國實行的是稅收承包制，地方政府大體上只需要上繳國家一個雙方預先協定好的金額，超過這個金額的稅收，地方政府保留自己支配使用。
After the implementation of the tax-sharing system in 1994, the situation of weak central government and strong local governments has undergone a 180-degree change. In recent years, local fiscal and tax revenues have only accounted for 50%-55% of the country’s total fiscal and tax revenues, compared to more than 70% before the tax-sharing system; , Local budget expenditures accounted for 85% of the total national budget expenditures, which means that local fiscal budget expenditures have long been higher than budget revenues, and the part that cannot make ends meet needs to be filled by central transfer payments. 1994年實行分稅制之後，中央弱、地方強的情況出現了180度的轉變，近年來地方的財稅收入只是占全国财税总收入的50%—55%，而分税制之前这个比例是70%以上；同时，地方预算支出占全国预算总支出的比重为85%，也就是说地方财政预算支出长期高于预算收入，入不敷出的部分要通过中央转移支付来填补。
After the implementation of the tax-sharing system, China’s central government has more tax revenues and can better balance development between rich and poor areas through transfer payments, but this reform has also produced some new drawbacks. 分稅制實行之後，中國的中央政府擁有更多的稅收，可以更加好地對富裕地區與貧窮地區之間，透過轉移支付來平衡發展，但這個改革也產生了一些新的弊端。
One of the problems is the so-called “land finance” problem. If local governments want to achieve political success, they must develop the economy; and in order to get more money to develop the economy, they must increase non-budgetary revenue. The most important extra-budgetary revenue is the “land finance” generated around land transfer and development. China implements public ownership of land. Urban land is owned by the state, and rural land is owned by the collective. To convert agricultural land into construction land, it must first be converted into state-owned land through land acquisition before it can be used for industrial and commercial development or residential construction. If you add these taxes and land transfer revenue as the total revenue of “land finance”, the revenue of “land finance” in 2018 is equivalent to 89% of the local public budget revenue, which can be said to be the absolute main source of local government revenue. Moreover, under the design of the tax-sharing system, most of the revenue of the “land finance” does not need to be “divided” from the central government, so local governments have strong incentives to develop “land finance.” By 2019, China’s total fiscal revenue was 19 trillion yuan, of which land transfer funds accounted for 7.8 trillion yuan, more than 40%. This is only a project of land transfer fees, and other direct or indirect government revenues related to land have not been calculated. 其中一個問題就是所謂的「土地財政」問題。地方政府要取得政績，就要發展經濟；而為了獲得更多錢去發展經濟，就要增加預算以外的收入。其中最重要的預算外收入，就是圍繞土地出讓和開發所產生的「土地財政」。中國實行土地公有制，城市土地歸國家所有，農村土地歸集體所有。農地要轉為建設用地，必須先經過征地變成國有土地，然後才可以用來發展工商業或建造住宅。若把這些稅收與土地轉讓收入加起來算作「土地財政」的總收入，2018年「土地財政」收入相當於地方公共預算收入的89%，可以說是地方政府收入的絕對主要來源。而且，在分稅制的設計之下，「土地財政」大部分的收入都不需要與中央「拆賬」，所以地方政府有很強的動力發展「土地財政」。到了2019年，中國財政總收入19萬億人民幣，其中土地出讓金佔了7.8萬億，超過了40%。這裡只是考慮土地出讓金一個項目，還沒有計算與土地相關的其他直接或間接的政府收入。
Therefore, local governments in Mainland China have adopted the same approach as Hong Kong, restricting the supply of commercial and residential land, and earning more taxes from rising land prices. From 2000 to 2018, the price of commercial land increased by 4.6 times, and the price of residential land increased by 7.4 times. 因此，中國內地的地方政府采用了跟香港一樣的做法，限制商住用地供給，從不斷攀升的地價中賺取更多的稅收。從2000年到2018年，商業用地價格增長了4.6倍，住宅用地的價格更是大幅增長了7.4倍。
Of course, the local government does not use the land-related income directly for other public services, such as education or medical care. Although land transfer can bring income, local governments also have to bear related expenses, including land acquisition and demolition compensation, land leveling, water and electricity and other basic land development expenses. Judging from the figures in recent years, the expenses related to land transfer are generally similar to land income, and sometimes even higher than income. In 2018, the income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights was 6,291 billion yuan, and the expenditure was 6,816.7 billion yuan. Looking at the land sale itself, the local government cannot make ends meet, but the real purpose of the local government is to attract industrial and commercial economic activities after land development, that is, to “make the pie bigger.” Therefore, we can say that real estate has indeed been one of the main engines driving China’s economic development in the past two decades. 當然，地方政府不是把這些土地相關收入直接拿去作其他的公共服務，例如教育或者醫療。土地轉讓雖然能帶來收入，但地方政府也要負擔相關支出，包括征地拆遷補償和土地平整、通水通電等基礎性土地開發支出。從近幾年的數字看，跟土地轉讓有關的支出總體上與土地收入差不多，有時甚至比收入還高。2018年，國有土地使用權出讓金收入為62 910億元，支出則為68 167億元。光看賣地本身，地方政府是入不敷出的，但地方政府的真正目的是土地開發之後吸引而來的工商業經濟活動，亦即是「把餅做大」。因此我們可以說，過去二十年房地產的確是推動中國經濟發展的主要引擎之一。
But the problem is that this development method is not sustainable. Housing prices are too expensive for ordinary people to afford. Everyone knows this problem, but another more direct problem is that the land that can be sold has become less and less. 但問題是這個發展方法是不能夠持續的。房價太貴，一般人難以負擔，這個問題大家都知道，但另一個更加直接的問題是，能夠賣的地已經越來越少了。
In 2000, China’s urbanization rate was only 36%. In 2019, China’s urbanization rate exceeded 60%, creating the fastest miracle of urbanization in the world. Most cities in China have nearly doubled in the past 19 years. In the process of urbanization, agricultural land is converted into state-owned land through land acquisition, and local governments can collect a large amount of land transfer fees. However, the urbanization rate of most western developed countries is only about 70%, and the urbanization rate of the United States is only 83%. In the next 10 to 20 years, if China’s urbanization rate can reach 70%, it will almost be the limit, and it has reached the level of developed European countries. In other words, China’s urbanization will soon face a ceiling, and the speed of urbanization will inevitably slow down. When the farmland that can be requisitioned gradually decreases, the income from the land transfer fee of the local government will naturally also gradually decrease 在2000年，中國的城市化率只是36%。2019年，中國的城市化率突破了60%，創造全世界城市化進程最快的奇跡。中國絕大多數城市，在過去的19年裏，擴張了接近一倍。在城市化的過程中，農地經過征地變成國有土地，地方政府就可以收取大量的土地出讓金。但絕大多數西方發達國家的城市化率都只是達到70%左右，美國的城市化率也只是83%。在未來一二十年，中國的城市化率如果能夠達到70%，幾乎就是極限了，已經達到歐洲發達國家的水平。換句話說，中國的城市化很快會面臨天花板，城市化的速度也必然會放慢。當可以征收的農地逐步減少，地方政府的土地出讓金收入也自然也會逐步降低。
Whether it is for the purpose of suppressing housing prices and preventing hoarding and speculation, or for the sustainable development of local government revenue, it is necessary to start to levy taxes on the houses that already exist in the market to reduce the reliance on taxes on uncompleted new buildings. Real estate tax, in this context, is an inevitable development. 無論是為了壓抑房價和防止囤積炒賣，還是為了地方政府財政收入的可持續發展，都需要開始對市場上已經存在的住宅征稅，以減少對未落成的新樓征稅的依賴。房地產稅，在這個背景之下，是一個必然的發展。
Of course, real estate taxes have been discussed in China for many years. The reason why it has not been implemented is that the problem was not very urgent in the early days. On the other hand, a good real estate tax plan is indeed difficult to design. 當然，房地產稅在中國討論了已經很多年。一直未能落實的原因，固然是因為在早期這個問題不是很迫切，而另一方面，一個好的房地產稅方案，確實也是很難設計的。
Let us take the threshold as an example to look at the complexity of the real estate tax policy. If you do not set an exemption area and no exemption amount, and directly levy real estate taxes on all owners of houses based on the value of their properties, what will happen to this seemingly fairest way? In large cities, there are countless indigenous people who got their current houses for free or at a low price during the housing reform decades ago, or they happened to buy houses when housing prices were very low. The property they own is of high value, but their own income is very low. Suppose they have a property value of 10 million in first-tier cities, which is levied at a 1% tax rate, and they have to pay a real estate tax of 100,000 yuan a year, but many of these people cannot pay the 100,000 yuan a year. Although this kind of people owns very valuable real estate, they are indeed a disadvantaged group in the city in a sense. Their salary is not high, or they have already retired at an old age and cannot objectively pay real estate taxes. 我們就以起征點作為一個例子，看看房地產稅政策的復雜性。如果不設定一個免征面積，沒有免征金額，直接對所有的有房一族按房產價值徵收房地產稅，這個看似最公平的方式，會出現什麽問題呢？在大城市裏面，有無數土著居民，是幾十年前房改的時候免費或者低價得到了現在的住宅，又或者是當年房價很低的時候恰好買了房。他們擁有的房產價值很高，但本身收入很低。假設他們在一線城市的房產值1000萬，按1%稅率征收，一年就要交10萬人民幣房地產稅，但這些人很多一年拿不出這10萬元來。這種人雖然擁有很值錢的房產，但某種意義上也確實是城市的弱勢群體，工資不高，或者已經上了年紀退休了，客觀上支付不了房地產稅。
Therefore, many experts propose to set an exempted area, but the exempted area is also unfair. Regardless of whether the per capita area of the family is 30 square meters or 40 square meters, there is a problem. Because the house price is different in each place, the same exempt area will be converted into a different amount of exemption in different places. 因此，很多專家提議設定一個免征面積，但免征面積也有不公平的地方。無論家庭人均面積是30平米還是40平米，都有一個問題，就是因為每個地方的房價不一樣，所以同樣的免征面積，換算成為房價就會變成了各地免征金額不一樣。
It is true that the level of economic development in different regions is different, and it is difficult to have absolute fairness. However, the personal income tax threshold in China is unified throughout the country. No matter the local average wage level is high or low, it is levied starting with a monthly income of more than 5,000 yuan. If the threshold of real estate tax is not unified nationwide, will the people feel that it violates the principle of fairness? 的而且確，各地經濟發展水平不一樣，很難有絕對的公平，但中國的個人所得稅起征點全國統一，無論當地的平均工資水平高還是低，都是每月收入5000人民幣以上開始征收。房地產稅的起征點如果不是全國統一，又會不會讓人民覺得違反了公平的原則呢？
Similar problems have plagued Chinese policymakers for many years. As early as 2011, Shanghai and Chongqing became real estate tax pilots, but the real estate tax policies introduced by these two cities were too narrow and the tax rate was too low to achieve significant results. On October 23, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China decided to authorize the State Council to carry out real estate tax reform pilot work in some areas. It was obviously determined to formulate a more comprehensive levy scope, more reasonable tax rates, and promote the nation’s real estate tax system. 類似的問題，困擾了中國的政策製定者很多年。早在2011年，上海和重慶就成為房產稅試點，但是這兩個城市推出的房地產稅政策因為征收範圍太窄，而且稅率太低，沒有顯著的成效。而10月23日中國全國人大常委會決定授權國務院在部分地區開展房地產稅改革試點工作，明顯是下了決心，要製定一個征收範圍更全面，稅率更為合理，而且可以推廣全國的房地產稅制度。
The Chinese government has definitely adopted a lot of supporting measures in order to promote such an important policy as the real estate tax. In addition to the Central Finance and Economics Commission’s emphasis on common prosperity in August, if we are concerned about China’s policy changes, we will find that the Ministry of Natural Resources has introduced new rules for the implementation of the “two centralizations” of residential land supply in key cities in February, that is, a centralized release announcement. , Centrally organize the transfer activities, through the centralized transfer of land in three batches throughout the year, to prevent local governments from “squeezing toothpaste” from restricting the supply of residential land. In June, the Ministry of Finance issued another policy, one of which is that starting from January 1, 2022, land transfer fees will be collected by the tax bureau. This policy is very ingenious and is called “collection, management and transfer.” That is, the central government collects taxes and then transfers taxes to the local governments. While returning power to the central government, it reduces local resistance. The latest policy, the implementation of real estate tax pilots, is even more a new policy formulation method with Chinese characteristics. Starting from the pilot, the experience of the new policy is summarized, and then gradually extended to the whole country, thereby reducing the impact and shock caused by the new policy. 中國政府對於推進像房地產稅這麽重要的政策，肯定是按部就班，采取了很多的配套手段。除了中央財經委員會8月份強調共同富裕之外， 如果我們有關注中國的政策變化，會發現2月份自然資源部已經推出重點城市施行住宅用地供應「兩集中」的新規則，即是集中發布出讓公告、集中組織出讓活動，透過全年分3 批次集中出讓土地，防止地方政府「擠牙膏」式限制住宅用地供應。6月份的時候，財政部又出了一個政策，其中一個內容是由2022年1月1日開始，土地出讓金由稅務局征收。這個政策非常巧妙，叫做「征管劃轉」，即是中央征收，稅金再轉給地方政府，把權力收歸中央的同時，減輕地方的抵觸情緒。而最新的政策，開展房地產稅試點，更加是有中國特色的新政策制定方式，從試點開始，總結新政策的經驗，再逐步推廣至全國，從而減少新政策帶來的衝擊和震盪。
Many foreigners feel that China is full of policy risks because they do not understand China. In fact, as long as we have a little bit more understanding of the specific operation of the Chinese government and some basic understanding of China’s public finance system, it is actually not difficult to understand and predict the future direction of China’s policies. 很多外國人因為對中國不了解，覺得中國充滿政策風險。其實，只要我們對中國政府的具體運作有多一點理解，對中國的公共財政體系有一些基本的認識，其實不難理解和預測中國政策的未來走向。
62 nations at UN support China against US Nazi style fake news propaganda on Xinjiang in an attempt to engage in subversive activities against Chinese, Chinese Americans and China promoting hate crimes in US.
Congressman Ted Lieu Questions AG Garland on “China Initiative” and Racial Profiling
On October 21, 2021, the House Judiciary Committee held an oversight hearing on the U.S. Department of Justice. Congressman Ted Lieu asked Attorney General Merrick Garland several questions on the “China Initiative” and implicit bias training. AG Garland appeared to be unprepared for the issues raised as evidenced by his responses:
The COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act cited by AG Garland was enacted to address anti-Asian hate violence, not the racial profiling and discrimination concerns raised by Congressman Lieu. The implicit bias training mandated by then AG Loretta Lynch in June 2016 serves to reduce bias and discrimination in law enforcement. The NO FEAR Act of 2002 cited by AG Garland applies federal managers and supervisors on unlawful discrimination and retaliation. One tweet also commented that tackling implicit bias requires work far beyond “training” and hopes that the Department of Justice commits to a holistic response.
AG Garland stated that there will be a review of the “China Initiative,” but it will be conducted by Matt Olsen, who was nominated by the President to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division on May 27, 2021. He has not yet been confirmed after 6 months, and the Senate has not set a date for his confirmation.
At the end of his questions, Congressman Lieu submitted three documents for record:
2021/09/08 Winds of Freedom: Stanford Faculty Members Open Letter to AG Garland to End the “China Initiative”
2021/09/21 Committee of 100: Racial Disparities in Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: A Window Into The New Red Scare
2021/09/25 University World News: Professor acquittal – Is China Initiative out of control?
Watch the exchange between Congressman Lieu and AG Garland here: https://bit.ly/3GfBWlU (video 5:37)
Update on Campaign to Send Letter to AG Garland to End the “China Initiative” On October 18, 2021, 198 Princeton faculty members endorsed the Stanford letter and sent their letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland calling for the end of the “China Initiative.” On October 22, 2021, the Asian American Scholar Forum posted an open message Call for Your support on Open Letters to End “China Initiative.” To date, APA justice has collected over 275 sign-ons from more than 110 institutions to its letter to be sent to AG Garland in the first week of November. Please help to spread the word and encourage faculty members, scholars, and administrators across the country to join the campaign by:
Following the Instructions in the Winds of Freedom website to endorse the Stanford letter or send your own letter: https://bit.ly/38ZxKre
Peter Michelson, Senior Associate Dean at Stanford University, will speak on this topic in the November 1 APA Justice monthly meeting, along with Princeton University Professor Kai Li, American Physical Society Director of Government Affairs Mark Elsesser, and University at Albany Professor Ron Yang.
What will happen to Taiwan if US successfully destroying Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the entire semiconductor sectors to be replaced by Intel and other US companies? What is left for the future of Taiwan Province?如果美國成功摧毀台積電和台灣整個半導體產業讓英特爾等美國公司取代，台灣省的將來會怎樣？
Johnson Choi Biz 